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CHAPTER
British philosopher John Stu-art Mill once said: “All greatmovements experience three
stages: Ridicule. Discussion. Adop-
tion.” (in Wiebers, Gillan, and
Wiebers 2000, 169). As movements
reach the level of adoption into
mainstream society, they acquire a
certain level of legitimacy, often
reinforced through the passage of
legislation that validates the funda-
mental principles they promote.
Contemporary theorist Bill Moyer’s
(1987) conceptualization of a social
movement’s evolution adds greater
complexity to Mill’s assertion. 
Moyer asserts that a social move-
ment has eight stages, which oper-
ate cyclically (although the various
goals within the movement may be
at different stages at any one time).
The first three stages cover the
early organization and recruitment
of adherents. The movement then
typically gains momentum from a
“trigger event”—one that brings
public awareness to a social prob-
lem—that pushes the movement
into stage four. In this stage, the
media “discovers” the movement,
and the wider public begins to
attend to the movement’s issues.
This is a relatively short phase (for
the modern phase of the animal
protection movement, it lasted for
about fifteen years, until 1990)
(Herzog 1995). In stages five and
six, some movement followers
enter the dead-end phase five.
These followers perceive the lack of
major legislative change emanating
from the media attention as a fail-
ure and either burn out or develop
much more aggressive techniques.
Stage six is peopled by those follow-
ers and organizations that take
advantage of the media attention
to get at least some of the issues
onto the public agenda, leading to
some concrete achievements. Ulti-
mately Moyer defines social move-
ments as “collective actions in
which the populace is alerted, edu-
cated, and mobilized, over the
years and decades, to challenge the
power holders and the whole socie-
ty to redress social problems or
grievances and restore critical
social values” (Moyer 1987, 3). 
The animal protection move-
ment has historically relied on leg-
islation as a key element to pro-
mote and enact its reform agenda.
Moyer’s model helps to place and
analyze when, why, and how the
movement (or parts of it) gets its
issues onto the public agenda. Over
the years, animal organizations
have committed significant effort
and resources to the passage of leg-
islation leading to greater legal
protection for animals. However,
some eras have led to the passage
of more laws than have other eras.
From 1900 to 1950, only one feder-
al law addressing animals was
passed, although individual states
did pass or amend animal protec-
tion laws during this period. Table 1
lists the federal laws passed and
amended that deal with animal pro-
tection, demonstrating the consid-
erable success and increase in
political influence that the animal
movement has enjoyed in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century.
Federal law is only one dimen-
sion of the movement’s legislative
reform, however. Its political influ-
ence has reached not only Con-
gress but also state legislatures,
which are also much more active in
addressing animal issues. One of
the more significant accomplish-
ments for the animal protection
movement has been the passage
over the last two decades of felony-
level animal-cruelty statutes that
permit certain abuses against ani-
mals to be prosecuted as felonies
rather than as misdemeanors, as in
the past. Nine states passed felony
animal-cruelty laws between 1994
and 1997 (Table 2) and the pace
accelerated between 1998 and
Introduction
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2001, as an additional sixteen
states adopted felony legislation.
As of 2003 forty-one states and the
District of Columbia had felony
level animal-cruelty statutes on
their books, and Nebraska, Mon-
tana, Connecticut, Texas, Nevada,
Virginia, and Colorado had upgrad-
ed their original felony animal-
cruelty laws.
Even with the greater momen-
tum in the states to enact state
felony anti-cruelty legislation,
other legislative initiatives were not
successful. The animal protection
movement began to adopt a new
tactic, the citizen-initiative (“direct
democracy”) process, in the twenty
or so states that allowed such peti-
tions. Between 1990 and 2002,
twenty animal protection initiatives
were passed, and six anti-animal
measures were defeated. Overall,
thirty-nine initiatives that affected
animal protection were introduced
during the period and, in twenty-six
cases, the result was a win for ani-
mal protection. 
However, passage of new legisla-
tion does not necessarily provide
satisfactory protections for ani-
mals. The new legislation must be
supported by adequate funding and
effective enforcement. Little if any
legislation is perfect, and usually
continuing efforts to improve a
statute will be needed. 
As the animal movement has
gained more political authority
and public acceptance, it needs
better ways to assess and follow its
progress—or lack thereof—to-
wards its goals. In this era, in
which nonprofits and funding
agencies are demanding better
measures of effectiveness, the ani-
mal movement needs to examine
how it looks at the progress it is
(or is not) making in gaining bet-
ter legal protection for animals. 
Federal
Legislation
Between 1958 and 1972 three
major pieces of federal animal pro-
tection legislation were passed,
the Humane Slaughter  Act
(1958), the Animal Welfare Act
(1966), and the Marine Mammal
Protection Act (1972). These
serve as the basis for the following
analysis. Given that before 1958,
the last federal animal protection




1958 Humane Slaughter Act
1959 Wild Horses Act
1962 Bald and Golden Eagle Act
1966 Endangered Species Act
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act
1970 Animal Welfare Act (amendments to Laboratory Animal 
Welfare Act)
1971 Wild Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act
1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act
1973 Endangered Species Act amendments
CITES
1976 Animal Welfare Act amendments
Horse Protection Act
Fur Seal Act
1978 Humane Slaughter Act amendments
1985 Animal Welfare Act amendments (focus on alternatives 
and pain and distress)
PHS Policy on animals in research revised
1990 Animal Welfare Act amendments
1992 Wild Bird Conservation Act
1993 International Dolphin Conservation Act
Driftnet Fishery Conservation Act
NIH Revitalization [Reauthorization] Act mandates development
of research methods using no animals
1995 USDA ends face branding 
1999 Ban on the interstate shipment of “crush videos”
2000 Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, 
and Protection Act
2002 Dog and Cat Protection Act
Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of
Alternative Methods (ICCVAM) Authorization Act
Safe Air Travel for Animals Act
Ban on interstate transportation of birds and dogs for fighting
purposes 
2003 Captive Exotic Animal Protection Act
Source: Unti and Rowan 2001, 34–37; HSUS 2004.
Year Federal Legislation Passed/Amended
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1906, these three legislative victo-
ries, plus the other legislation list-
ed in Table 1, demonstrate the rise
of the animal movement from
political oblivion in the first half  of
the twentieth century to a position
where lawmakers would listen if
the context and the proposal were
timely and supported by the socie-
tal and political mood. (The
Endangered Species Act was also
passed during this period and was
supported by many animal protec-
tion organizations, but it is not
strictly animal protection legisla-
tion, that is, it does not seek to
prevent or prohibit animal distress
or suffering caused by the human
use of animals.)  
The Humane Slaughter Act
(HSA) established a very basic
humane standard of care for farm
animals during slaughter (namely,
that they should be made insensi-
ble to pain). The Animal Welfare
Act mandates humane standards
for the handling, treatment, and
transportation of “any warm blood-
ed animal used for research, test-
ing, experimentation, or exhibition
purposes,” although farm animals
used in food production and birds,
mice, and rats used in research are
excluded from its coverage. The
Marine Mammal Protection Act
imposes a moratorium on “harass-
ing, hunting, capturing, or killing
all marine mammals” (Animal Wel-
fare Institute 1990, 190). 
Humane Methods 
of Slaughter Act: 
An Assessment
In the early days of The Humane
Society of the United States
(HSUS), after its split from the
American Humane Association
(AHA) in 1954, Fred Myers, HSUS
president, was determined to
instill a broader vision of the
importance of nationally organized
initiatives and to lead local organi-
zations in setting their sights on
achieving larger strategic objec-
tives (HSUS 1956). One of the
points of tension in the internal
AHA schism concerned the pre-
slaughter handling and slaughter of
animals used for food. Therefore, it
is not surprising that the first
national campaign that the newly
formed HSUS launched focused on
that issue. During 1955 and 1956,
The HSUS diverted every available
dollar from its budget into the
drive for slaughterhouse reform
and generated widespread publici-
ty on the issue. Myers lined up sig-
nificant sources of public support
for the HSA and testified on its
behalf in 1958, the year in which it
passed (Unti 2004).
Myers took great encouragement
from the fact that, between 1954
and 1958, the animal protection
movement had united to achieve
passage of a federal humane
slaughter law that would spare
approximately 100 million animals
a year from pain and suffering. It
was also a vindication of the vision
that had driven the formation of
The HSUS, namely, the idea “that
hundreds of local societies could
lift their eyes from local problems
to a great national cruelty” (Unti
2004, 6). Passage of the HSA repre-
sented the first time since enact-
ment of the 28-Hour Law (regulat-
ing how long livestock could be
transported without being given a
food and water rest) more than fifty
years earlier that the federal gov-
ernment had agreed to address an
animal welfare issue. By and large,
animal protection in the 1950s was
perceived to be the domain of the
state legislatures (e.g., anti-cruelty
and related legislation). 
The HSA required slaughter
plants selling meat to the U.S. gov-
ernment (roughly 80 percent of all
U.S. meatpacking plants) to abide
by humane methods of slaughter
set by the federal government. The
U.S. government was the largest
purchaser of meat, buying $300
million worth annually (Unti 2004,
45). According to the law, cattle,
sheep, swine, goats, horses, mules,
and other equines must be slaugh-
tered humanely, usually by render-
ing these animals “insensible to
pain by a single blow or gunshot or
an electrical, chemical, or other
means that is rapid and effective,
before being shackled, hoisted,
thrown, cast, or cut” (7 U.S.C.A.
§1902). One loophole in the law
permitted the armed forces to pur-
chase meat that did not have to be














1994 Del., Mo., N.H., Wash.
1995 La., Ore., Pa.
1996 Conn.
1997 Tex.
1998 Ind., N.C., Vt.
1999 Ariz., Ill., Nev., N.Y., 
Va.
2000 Ala., Ga., Iowa, S.C.
2001 D.C., Md., Minn., N.J.,
Tenn.
2002 Colo., Ohio, Me.
2003 Ky., W.V., Wy.
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as long as the purchased amount
did not exceed $2,500. While it is
unclear exactly how much meat
fell into this category, “a consider-
able portion of that volume [was]
understood to be acquired in lots
of $2,500 or less”(Animal Welfare
Institute 1990, 55). 
Under the concerted efforts of
Sen. Robert Dole (R-KS) and Rep.
George E. Brown (D-CA), the HSA
was amended and renamed the
Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
(HMSA)  in  1978 .  Wi th  th i s
strengthened law, not only plants
that sold meat to the government
but also all plants that wanted to be
U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA)-certified had to follow the
humane methods of slaughter
guidelines. Federal inspectors had
the authority to shut down inhu-
mane slaughter operations until
they were modified to comply with
humane standards (although such
action was very rare). Any meat im-
ported into the United States had
to be from humanely slaughtered
animals. In 2002 the HMSA was
amended further to request that
the Secretary of Agriculture report
to Congress on the condition of
nonambulatory livestock (downed
animals) in slaughter houses. 
“Downer” animals had become a
focus of increased animal protec-
tion concern well before 2002.
Since the 102nd Congress in 1994,
animal protection groups had lob-
bied for passage of the Downed Ani-
mal Protection Act, which would
end the slaughter of downed ani-
mals for human consumption. The
bill requires that any downed ani-
mal be euthanized before it reach-
es the slaughterhouse. A decade
after its first introduction in Con-
gress, the Downed Animal Protec-
tion Act was added to the 2004
agriculture appropriations bill, only
to be removed at the last minute.
Shortly thereafter, when the first
case of so-called mad cow disease
was discovered in the United
States, Agriculture Secretary Ann
Veneman announced that downed
animals would be banned from the
human food chain. While this
administrative reaction could be
construed as something of a victory
for animal advocates, as of 2005,
the movement was still pushing for
passage of the Downed Animal Pro-
tection Act to give greater perma-
nency to the existing administra-
tive ban. 
In assessing progress on the
downed animal issue, a more nu-
anced measure is needed than sim-
ple passage of the bill into law. One
possibility is to follow the level of
support via the number of cospon-
sors who sign on in each Congress.
Figure 1 illustrates the steady in-
crease in the proportion of mem-
bers of Congress who have co-
sponsored the Downed Animal
Protection Act, showing how sup-
port for the legislation has risen
over time.
While this increase may be a
measure of the effectiveness and
impact of lobbying by animal
activists, other forces are at work
as well. In The Washington Post
Warrick (2001) exposed the abu-
sive violations of the HMSA in vari-
ous slaughter facilities, describing
in detail how cattle remained alive
throughout the slaughter process.
Relying on the accounts of slaugh-
ter facility workers, inspectors,
and technicians, Warrick also de-
scribed how such facilities were
allowed to continue to operate
despite being cited for numerous
violations of the HMSA.  
The Washington Post article
prompted Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV)
to deliver a speech on July 9, 2001,
in the U.S. Senate asking for
stricter oversight of U.S. slaughter
facilities. In this passionate speech,
the first ever of its kind on farm
animals, Byrd exclaimed: “The law
clearly requires that these poor
creatures be stunned and rendered
insensitive to pain before this
process begins. Federal law is be-
ing ignored. Animal cruelty
abounds” (Congressional Record
2001, S7311). Between 2001 and
2004, $1 million was appropriated
to the USDA to hire seventeen
regional managers to oversee en-
forcement of the HMSA, as was an
additional $5 million to hire at
least fifty inspectors to work solely
on ensuring compliance with the
law (HSUS 2004).
Even taking into account the
1958 passage of the humane
slaughter legislation, its subse-
quent amendments, and the
increase in funding for it, the struc-
tural problems with enforcement of
the Act remain in place. As the ani-
mal movement continues to inves-
Figure 1
Percentage of Members of Congress
Co-sponsoring the Downed Animal
Protection Bill (102nd–107th Congress)
Source: HSUS (1994–2004).
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tigate slaughter facilities and gain
political ground, it presses to have
the HMSA amended again to
include poultry under its humane
standards. In 2004 People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals
(PETA) conducted an undercover
investigation of a slaughter facili-
ty. The findings of the investiga-
tion, including chickens being
kicked and thrown against a wall,
reached major media outlets
throughout the country. The video
footage not only prompted public
outrage, but it also created an
opportunity for the movement to
urge Congress to amend the
HMSA. Following the PETA investi-
gation, The HSUS announced a
campaign to lobby for the inclu-
sion of poultry in the HMSA and
offered a petition for individuals to
sign asking Congress for this
inclusion. As of mid-2005, more
than eighty thousand signatures
had been collected.  
Despite the recent success in
obtaining legislation addressing
humane handling and slaughter of
livestock, there is considerable
room for improvement, not only in
the legislative underpinnings of
humane handling and slaughter
but also in the enforcement of the
existing but relatively rudimentary
legislation dealing with farm ani-
mal protection (especially impor-
tant given the 8 billion animals a
year raised and slaughtered in the
United States). Everybody can
agree that animals should not be
badly handled and tormented when
they are transported and slaugh-
tered. However, the law is still too
narrowly focused (it does not cover
religious slaughter and poultry, for
example) and it has been enforced
poorly from its implementation.
For example, USDA stations its
inspectors in slaughter facilities to
inspect and certify that animals are
slaughtered humanely, but these
inspectors receive their USDA pay-
checks via the companies they
inspect and are “embedded” in
those companies in ways that make
it very difficult for them to take
effective action if they see problems




In 1972 the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act (MMPA) was passed.
This law imposed a moratorium on
the “harassing, hunting, captur-
ing, or killing” of all marine mam-
mals. The Secretary of Commerce
may grant permits to allow the tak-
ing and importation of marine
mammals: (1) for scientific re-
search or public display; (2) as
incidental bycatch in commercial
fishing; and (3) in accord with
sound principles of resource pro-
tection and conservation (16
U.S.C. §§ 1361–1421h). In 1992
the Dolphin Conservation Act was
added to the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act, banning certain tuna-
harvesting practices that threat-
ened dolphin populations. The law
was amended again in 1994 to
reduce the incidental taking of
marine mammals during commer-
cial fishing activities.  
The MMPA is a relatively com-
prehensive law from the perspec-
tive of animal advocates, and the
United States is one of the few
countries with such a strong law.
The law does include certain ex-
emptions to the moratorium,
however, such as capturing
marine animals for public display,
even when the educational value,
the basis for the exemption, is in
dispute. The law embodies de
facto credibility for educational
purposes; a marine mammal facil-
ity is not required to show how its
exhibit is educational. Plus, there
are no explicit standards for keep-
ing such animals, and the stan-
dards that do exist are difficult to
enforce. Furthermore, the law was
weakened when it was reautho-
rized in 1994. Before 1994 one
needed explicit permission to
import or export a marine mam-
mal, but, after reauthorization,





Even before closing the HSA cam-
paign in 1958, The HSUS had
begun to turn its attention to the
suffering of animals in research,
testing, and education, joining the
Animal Welfare Institute in a cam-
paign to reform practices in the
country’s laboratories. 
Generally speaking, the Animal
Welfare Act (AWA), enforced by
USDA, establishes the standards
that govern the humane handling,
care, treatment, and transporta-
tion of animals by dealers, research
facilities, and exhibitors and also
sets a standard by which animals
are handled for transportation in
commerce. While the law defines
“animal” as any warm-blooded ani-
mal used for research, testing, ex-
perimentation, or exhibition pur-
poses, or as a pet, it excludes horses
not used for research purposes,
farm animals, and birds, mice, and
rats used in research (U.S.C. §§
2131–2159). It also prohibits
interstate transportation of ani-
mals, including live birds used for
fighting purposes. 
The Laboratory Animal Welfare
Act was passed in 1966 “to provide
humane standards for dogs, cats,
primates, rabbits, hamsters, and
guinea pigs in animal dealers’
premises and in laboratories prior
to experimental use of animals”
(Animal Welfare Institute 1990,
77). It was later amended in 1970
(when it was renamed the Animal
Welfare Act) and amended further
in 1976, 1985, 1990, and 2002. In
1970 the amendments required
that the humane standards must be
applied not only before the experi-
mental use of animals but also
throughout the entire stay of ani-
mals in laboratories. The amended
law applied to all warm-blooded
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animals determined by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture as being used or
intended for use in experimenta-
tion or exhibition except horses not
used in research and farm animals
used in food and fiber research. 
In 1976 the law was amended to
require research laboratories to pay
similar fines as those for animal
exhibitors and dealers who violated
the standards set by the AWA. A pro-
vision was added to prohibit inter-
state transportation of dogs used
for animal-fighting ventures. In
1985, in response to several public
scandals about the mistreatment of
laboratory animals in research proj-
ects, the guidelines regarding stan-
dards of care and alleviation of pain
and distress were made more specif-
ic. (For example, the law required
that the pain and distress suffered
by laboratory animals be reduced,
and that psychological well-being be
enhanced by providing adequate
exercise for dogs and an enriched
physical environment for primates.)
The AWA was amended again in
1990 to establish a holding period
for dogs and cats at shelters and
other holding facilities before sale
to dealers; in addition, dealers had
to provide written certification to
the recipient regarding each ani-
mal’s background. 
In 1989 The HSUS and the Ani-
mal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF)
resorted to litigation to reverse
USDA’s administrative exclusion of
rats, mice, and birds from regulato-
ry coverage by the AWA. The litiga-
tion asked the U.S. District Court
to force USDA to protect all warm-
blooded animals used in research
laboratories. Although the district
court sided with the petitioners
and found that exclusion of rats,
mice, and birds from coverage was
an arbitrary and capricious action
by USDA, the appeals court later
ruled that the animal protection
groups did not have legal standing
to sue in federal court to force
USDA to change its decision.  
In 1999 the American Anti-Vivi-
section Society (AAVS) filed a new
lawsuit on the issue. One year later
the court found that it had stand-
ing to sue for injunctive relief. At
this point, USDA decided to nego-
tiate with the AAVS and reportedly
agreed to promulgate regulations
that would cover birds, rats, and
mice used in research. This devel-
opment caused considerable alarm
among the medical research lobby,
which was able to have a rider
inserted into a federal appropria-
tions bill that forbade USDA to use
any federal funds to promulgate
such regulations. In 2002 the par-
ticularly powerful senior senator
from North Carolina, Jesse Helms,
inserted an amendment into the
farm bill that permanently exclud-
ed rats, mice, and birds used in
research from AWA oversight. This
development indicated that, al-
though the animal protection
movement has gained political
influence and public support, the
research lobby still has the ability
to get a few key politicians to listen
to its concerns. To date there are
no indications that the movement
will have sufficient influence to
reverse this loss because the public
is not that strongly moved by con-
cern for the welfare of mice, rats,
and birds. 
In 2002 an amendment was
added to prohibit interstate trans-
portation of live birds for fighting
purposes. This amendment was
intended to hamper the illegal
cockfighting industry as well as
cockfighting activities in the last
two U.S. states, Louisiana and New
Mexico, where it remained legal as
of mid-2005. Since the amendment
was passed, several cockfighting
pits have been shut down. But part
of the original amendment that
would have established felony jail
penalties for engaging in an animal
fight was dropped during the con-
ference committee discussion of
the 2002 farm bill (to which the
cockfighting AWA amendment was
attached). In 2003 and 2005, the
animal protection movement
continued its efforts on animal
fighting, and the Animal Fighting
Prohibition Act was introduced
authorizing felony penalties for ani-
mal fighting as well as a ban on the
interstate commerce of cockfight-
ing implements. 
Figure 2
AWA Appropriations Funding, 
1970–2004
Source: Tom Engle, APHIS/USDA, August 26, 2004.
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The animal movement has
argued that the AWA has not been
enforced adequately since it was
passed. Part of the problem has
been a lack of resources. In the
past ten to twenty years, an unlike-
ly coalition of animal protection
and research defense groups has
been established to press for larger
budgets for AWA enforcement.
This is one of those areas where
everybody perceives a benefit from
more effective and more consis-
tent enforcement. The AWA en-
forcement budget is shown in Fig-
ure 2 (the budget in actual dollars
is provided on one line; the budget
in inflation-adjusted dollars on the
other line). The inflation-adjusted
column indicates that real funding
for AWA enforcement increased in
two distinct periods. From 1989 to
1992 funding increased from
about $9 million to $12 million,
and from 2000 to 2003 funding
increased again, from approxi-
mately $11 million to $16 million.
The 81 percent increase in actu-
al dollars (or the 50 percent
increase in inflation-adjusted dol-
lars) appropriated for AWA enforce-
ment from 1999 to 2003 has
arguably led to more effective over-
sight by USDA inspectors of the
approximately ten thousand sites
(including research institutes,
zoos, puppy mills, circuses and
other exhibitors, and commercial
breeders) because of the hiring of
more than forty additional inspec-
tors (HSUS 2004). However, the
effectiveness of enforcement is not
simply a measure of how many
inspectors there are. From a per-
spective outside the Animal Care
section in USDA/APHIS (Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Ser-
vice), it would appear that enforce-
ment of the AWA (and the morale
of the Animal Care staff) was more
effective at the end of the 1990s
than it is today. Certainly, the infor-
mation mandated under the AWA is
much less available today, despite
expansion of the World Wide Web.
Thus, developments under the
AWA represent a mixed outcome.
The animal movement can point to
changes that reflect broader cover-
age and more effective enforce-
ment, but there have also been set-
backs (such as the rats, mice, and
birds issue). The movement still
has ambitions to expand coverage
of the AWA. There is no specific
language in the AWA that address-
es the practice of mass commercial
breeding in puppy mills, for exam-
ple, and guidelines for handling
repeat violators of basic humane
standards (e.g., adequate veteri-
nary care, shelter, food, and sanita-
tion) are inadequate. As a result,
some puppy mills that have been
cited more than once for AWA vio-
lations are still in business. The
animal protection community lob-
bied (first in the 107th congres-
sional session and again in the
108th session) for the introduction
of the Puppy Protection Act. The
Puppy Protection Act would reduce
the number of times a female dog
may be whelped during a twenty-
four-month period, prevent fe-
males under one year old from
being bred, and provide stricter
penalties for puppy mills violating
the AWA more than once in at least
eight months. 
Comparing the
Political Impact of the
Animal Movement
While the 1950s and 1960s were
decades of growing political clout,
Table 3 compares the legislative
output on behalf of animals for the
five-year period 1999–2003 with
the five-year period 1979–1983. It
is apparent that there has been
more success in the most recent
five-year period across most species
groups, with the possible exception
of wildlife. However, two of the four
successes on behalf of wildlife from
1979 to 1983 are more accurately
described as conservation rather
than animal protection measures.
While the accomplishments listed
between 1979 and 1983 are
exhaustive (not much occurred,
even though debate on several crit-
ical issues from the welfare of labo-
ratory animals to those of horses
used in the racing industry could
constitute what Mill defined as the
“discussion” stage of a movement’s
development), the 1999–2003 ac-
complishments listed are, from a
subjective viewpoint, not an ex-
haustive listing of legislative ac-
complishments. There are still
more of them, however, than in the
period in the early eighties. 
It should be noted that a discrep-
ancy remains among the recent
federal accomplishments. Some
accomplishments—the Animal
Fighting Act and the additional
funding for the AWA, both the
result of the movement’s determi-
nation—indicate that the animal
protection movement is growing
strong. But some accomplish-
ments, such as the Veneman deci-
sion regarding downed animals or
passage of the Captive Exotic Ani-
mal Protection Act (CEAPA), were
driven by events that originated
outside the movement’s planned
campaign activities. If mad cow
disease had not spread to the Unit-
ed States, downers would likely
have continued to be used in the
food chain, despite the repeated
efforts of animal protection lobby-
ists to stop the practice. In 2003
the captive exotic animal issue—
where the animal movement
sought to ban the keeping of exot-
ic animals, such as lions, tigers,
jaguars, and cougars as pets—
gained national attention when
Roy Horn, of the famous Las Vegas
entertainment duo Siegfried and
Roy, was mauled by one of his own
tigers during a show. This event,
reinforced when a private citizen
was mauled by a pet tiger he was
keeping in his small Harlem apart-
ment, received heavy media cover-
age and stimulated passage of the
CEAPA. 
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State Legislation
While it is relatively simple to track
the growth of animal protection leg-
islation at the federal level (there
are only two legislative bodies and
one executive), tracking and evalu-
ating legislative advances in fifty
states is much more difficult and
beyond our capacity for a detailed
analysis in this relatively brief chap-
ter. Therefore, we have chosen to
focus on one particular area of ani-
mal protection legislation, the pas-
sage of felony-level penalties as part
of state anti-cruelty laws. 
For most of the twentieth centu-
ry, only a handful of states included
felony-level penalties in their anti-
cruelty legislation. In the mid-
1980s, animal protection organiza-
tions began to highlight the link
between cruelty to animals and
other forms of human violence (the
name of the long-established HSUS
program on this issue, “First
Strike,” reflects the idea that the
animal is the first victim in a house-
hold to be abused). The fact that
animal cruelty or abuse is a poten-
tial indicator of individual violent
behavior (Lockwood and Ascione
1997) has driven considerable state
legislative activity since 1985. As of
the end of 2003, forty states and
the District of Columbia included
felony-level penalties in their anti-
cruelty statutes (Table 4). Wiscon-
sin, California, and Florida passed
felony penalty upgrades in the
1980s (Table 5). From 1990 to
1994, six more states did so, fol-
lowed by another eleven states from
1995 to 1999, and another sixteen
from 2000 to 2003.
By any measure, these state leg-
islative initiatives represent consid-
erable progress for the animal pro-
tection movement over the last
Table 3
Comparative Analysis of Federal Accomplishments
Major Federal Accomplishments
1979–1983 1999–2003
Animal Welfare Act •Provision on marine mammal • USDA AWA enforcement budget 
care standards added boosted by ca. 50 percent 
• Interstate commerce in birds 
and dogs used in animal 
fighting prohibited 
Companion Animals • Banned dog and cat fur products 
Cruelty Issues • Banned “crush videos” (where 
small animals are tortured/
crushed to death) 
Farm Animals • Obtained additional $6 million 
for enforcement of Humane
Slaughter Act 
• Banned the use of downer cattle 
for human consumption 
• Obtained $703,000 for hoop 
barns for pig raising 
Animals in Research • Passed legislation authorizing the
Interagency Coordinating Committee
for the Validation of Alternative
Methods (ICCVAM) 
• Passed legislation authorizing a
national sanctuary system for retired
laboratory chimpanzees 
Wildlife •Passed Alaska Lands bill— • Banned commerce in big cats 
designating more than 100 million for the pet trade
acres in Alaska as parks or wildlife • Banned practice of cutting fins off
refuges  sharks and discarding their bodies
•Added Marine Mammal Protection at sea while still alive
Act regulations
•National Park Service published 
final regulations banning trapping 
on some lands
Source: Internal HSUS documents
twenty years. When most anticruel-
ty statutes only carried misde-
meanor penalties, animal organiza-
tions had trouble convincing the
police and courts to spend any time
on animal-cruelty crimes. Since
felony-level penalties were estab-
lished, the police and courts have
taken a few egregious cases
through the courts, which conse-
quently administered significant
penalties. Thus, in a notorious Iowa
case, where three youths broke
into a shelter and mutilated and
killed a number of cats, the leader
of the group received a two-year
jail sentence (Bollinger 1998). 
The Iowa case illustrates why
states have agreed to institute
felony-level penalties. There are
some cases where it is clear that the
perpetrator of the abuse could be a
wider danger to society and where
the courts need to administer more
significant penalties than a few-hun-
dred-dollar fine. A.N.R. (in Ascione
and Arkow 1999) has argued that
one may classify cases of animal suf-
fering caused by humans in four
basic categories: intentional cruel-
ty, in which the perpetrator gains
satisfaction from the animal suffer-
ing; abuse, in which the behavior is
mainly a release of emotional energy
and where the animal’s suffering is a
by-product rather than a necessary
component for the perpetrator; neg-
lect, in which the animal’s suffering
is caused by the ignorance or lazi-
ness of the perpetrator; and use, in
which the animal may suffer but the
activity is sanctioned by society
(e.g., animal research, trapping, fac-
tory farming). Of these, the most
serious is intentional cruelty be-
cause it predicts significant future
(or current) sociopathic behavior
against other humans and animals.
Fortunately, intentional cruelty is
rare, as is animal abuse. Most
reported cases of animal cruelty fall
into the neglect category. We were
curious, therefore, to see how the
felony-level upgrades dealt with
issues of intentionality.
Favre and Loring (1983, 145) put
forth four critical questions that
must be asked when comparing
state cruelty statutes: (1) Which ani-
mals are protected by the statute?
(2) Which humans are held respon-
sible? (3) What is the scope of care
that is to be provided? (4) How is
the duty (to provide certain care)
qualified or exempted? With a large
majority of states now having felony-
level provisions, one must also con-
sider (5) the circumstances that
might lead to prosecution of a felony
versus a misdemeanor. From the ani-
mal protection perspective, the in-
tent of the perpetrator to cause
deliberate and premeditated animal









Source: www.hsus.org: Legislation and
Laws—Citizen Lobbyist Center.
States with Felony 
Anti-cruelty Legislation
Table 5
State Anti-cruelty Legislation 
with a Consideration for Language of Intent
Felony Language of Intent No. of States
Legislation? States
No Felony No language of intent 0
Language of intent 9 Alaska, Ark., Hawaii, Idaho, Kans., Miss., 
N.D., S.C., Utah 
Felony No language of intent in either 3 Minn., Nev., S.D.
Language of intent in felony 14 Calif., Conn., Del., D.C., Fla., Ill., Mass., 
but not misdemeanor Neb., N.H., N.J., N.M., Ohio, Okla., W.V.
language of intent in 1 Mo.
misdemeanor but not felony
Language of intent in both 24 Ala., Ariz., Colo., Ga., Iowa, Ind., Ky., La.,
Md., Me., Mich., Mont., N.C., N.Y., Ore.,
Pa.,  R.I., Tenn., Tex., Va., Vt., Wash., Wis.,
Wyo.
Source: State felony laws that can be found on state websites or databases such as Lexis-Nexis.
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ly abusive behavior would seem to be
a relatively simple way to distinguish
between animal-cruelty cases that
fall under the felony provisions and
those that remain misdemeanors.
However, more careful examination
of the laws that have been passed
and the way in which they are imple-
mented reveals that there is little
underlying logic to the felony-penal-
ty upgrades or to the way the courts
apply the anti-cruelty statutes.
The legislative language of intent
includes a variety of words in the def-
initions of animal cruelty: “inten-
tionally,” “willfully,” “knowingly,”
“maliciously,” and/or “purposefully.”
Comparing the definitions of these
words in the widely used Black’s
Law Dictionary (Black et al. 1990),
for example, provides little useful
guidance on how these terms might
be defined and distinguished. Law-
yers might argue that state laws can-
not be understood fully without
looking at their implementation
during court proceedings and case
outcomes. 
Favre and Loring (1983) separat-
ed animal-cruelty statutes into two
different categories, those without
any language of intent and those
with such language. All fifty states
and the District of Columbia have
animal-cruelty statutes. Three
states (Minnesota, Nevada, and
South Dakota) do not use language
of intent at all (Table 5). Of the
forty states and the District of
Columbia with felony provisions,
seventeen1 use the identical lan-
guage in their felony and misde-
meanor provisions (whether lan-
guage of intent is included or not).
Usually, offenders committing more
than one offense “graduate” to
receiving felony-level penalties in
subsequent violations of the misde-
meanor language. Connecticut, one
of the seventeen states, is an excep-
tion: a violator of one portion of the
animal-cruelty statute (containing
no language of intent) may be sub-
jected to either a misdemeanor or
felony-level penalty. However, in
another portion of the statute
where language of intent is used,
the offender, if convicted, must be
charged with a felony (Table 5).
In statutes where the language
differs between the felony and mis-
demeanor portions, those of nine
states2 and the District of Columbia
use some form of language of intent
in their felony portions but not in
their misdemeanor portions. Gener-
ally, one could therefore determine
that, for these statutes, evidence of
intent surrounding an act of animal
cruelty automatically amounts to a
more serous violation of the law.
Granted, the act of cruelty (e.g.,
mutilation versus general neglect)
may factor into stricter penalties.
However, there are nine examples
where there is a correlation between
intent and level of crime. All of the
remaining states3 without felony-
level penalties already include lan-
guage of intent in their misde-
meanor provisions. If these weaker
cruelty laws are eventually strength-
ened to include felony penalties, one
might question how the felony lan-
guage would be constructed and, in
turn, differentiated from the current
misdemeanor language. 
One possibility looks at the type
of cruelty associated with the lan-
guage of intent. Alabama, Illinois,
and Kentucky have misdemeanor
and felony provisions that both use
language of intent; however, the
felony provisions only apply to
companion animals. (In Pennsylva-
nia the felony provision only
applies to zoo animals.) 
The four states identified in
Table 6 (California, Florida, Illi-
nois, and Oregon) exemplify differ-
ent ways in which language of
intent is positioned. California has
inserted intent language in the
felony provision, while the original
misdemeanor language includes
terms such as mutilation, torture,
and killing of an animal. Califor-
nia’s anti-cruelty statute seems
especially strong for two critical
reasons: if any evidence of intent is
present, the offender must be con-
victed of a felony, but an offender
may also be convicted of a felony
even if intent is not present. 
In Florida, as in California, the
felony provision contains language
of intent, but the misdemeanor
language does not. The felony
penalty does not include the mis-
demeanor language, and the acts
under the felony penalty are seem-
ingly more severe than those under
the misdemeanor penalty. 
Unlike other states that tend to
lump cruel acts together, Illinois
separates different types of cruelty
into distinct categories. Basic ani-
mal cruelty (e.g., beating, starving,
overworking, cruelly treating) falls
into the misdemeanor category,
while repeated offenses, “aggravat-
ed cruelty,” and “animal torture”
are categorized as felonies. Both
aggravated cruelty and animal tor-
ture include language of intent. In
the case of aggravated cruelty, the
word “intentionally” is used; animal
torture includes the terms “know-
ingly” and “intentionally.” This rais-
es the question of why certain lan-
guage is used in parts of some
statutes and not in others. The
analysis of statute language raises
questions about the consistency of
the language of intent—what is
used and why. In the Oregon
statutes, “intentionally” and “know-
ing” precede all acts of animal cru-
elty marking a misdemeanor, but in
the felony language, “maliciously”
is used solely when an animal is
killed, while “intentionally” and
“knowingly” are linked to torture.  
To assess the impact of one
recent state felony anti-cruelty law,
it is useful to look at the experience
in Texas. The existing law was
amended in 2001, producing sever-
al years of experience in the applica-
tion of the felony penalty. In June
2004 Fikac (2004) reported the
number of individuals convicted of a
felony since 2001, based on data
provided by the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice (DCJ): twenty-
one people had served state prison
time since the 2001 law was enact-
ed, with six of them still in prison at
that time. The number excluded
the people who were convicted of a
felony but were given probation and
those who were jailed on a misde-
meanor conviction. 
The authors were given the
names of twenty of the convicted
felons by Texas DCJ. A search was
conducted in two databases: Lexis-
Nexis and a database of news clip-
pings on reported animal-cruelty
cases throughout the country main-
tained by The HSUS. Using the
Lexis-Nexis database, we were able
to find the jail time served by four-
teen of the twenty felons and the
type of felony with which they were
charged, but we were not given any
Table 6
Four-State Analysis of Language of Intent
State Year  Felony Felony Language Misdemeanor Language
Law Passed/
Amended
Calif. 1988 Every person who maliciously* and Every person who overdrives, overloads,
intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, drives when overloaded, overworks, tortures,
or wounds a living animal, or maliciously torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, 
and intentionally kills an animal. drink, or shelter, cruelly beats, mutilates,
or cruelly kills any animal, or causes or
Language identical to a misdemeanor procures any animal to be so overdriven,
offense. overloaded, driven when overloaded
overworked, tortured, tormented, deprived 
of necessary sustenance, drink, shelter, or to
be cruelly beaten, mutilated, or cruelly killed;
and whoever, having the charge or custody 
of any animal, either as owner or otherwise,
subjects any animal to needless suffering, or
inflicts unnecessary cruelty upon the animal,
or in any manner abuses any animal, or fails
to provide the animal with proper food, drink,
or shelter or protection from the weather, 
or who drives, rides, or otherwise uses the
animal when unfit for labor.
Fla. 1989, 1999 A person who intentionally commits an  A person who unnecessarily overloads,
act to any animal which results in the  overdrives, torments, deprives of necessary
cruel death, or excessive or repeated  sustenance or shelter, or unnecessarily
infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering, mutilates, or kills any animal, or causes the
or causes the same to be done. same to be done, or carries in or upon any
vehicle, or otherwise, any animal in a cruel 
or inhumane manner.
Ill. 1999 Cruel treatment or second or subsequent Cruel treatment: Beat, cruelly treat, starve,
offense. overwork, or otherwise abuse any animal.
Aggravated cruelty: intentionally commit  
an act that causes a companion animal to 
suffer serious injury or death.  
Animal torture: Knowingly or intentionally 
causes the infliction of or subjection to 
extreme physical pain, motivated by an 
intent to increase or prolong the pain, 
suffering or agony of the animal. 
Ore. 1995 A person commits the crime of aggravated A person commits the crime of animal abuse
animal abuse in the first degree if the in the first degree if, except as otherwise
person: maliciously kills an animal; or authorized by law, the person intentionally,
intentionally or knowingly tortures an knowingly or recklessly: causes serious
animal. physical injury to an animal; or cruelly 
causes the death of an animal.
Source: State felony laws that can be found on state websites or databases such as Lexis-Nexis. *Emphasis added in boldface throughout.
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information on the type of animal
cruelty any had committed. The
HSUS database of approximately
1,300 clippings a year found reports
of only three of the twenty felons. 
Those pushing for more effective
animal-cruelty legislation should
take steps to make sure that their
state law: (1) applies to all ani-
mals; (2) applies to first-time
offenders; (3) has large fines and
lengthy prison time as penalties;
(4) has no exemptions; (5) allows or
requires convicted abusers to get
counseling at their own expense;
and (6) prohibits abusers from pos-
sessing animals or living where ani-
mals are present (www.hsus.org:
Legislation and Laws/Citizen Lob-
byist Center).
In 2005 animal advocates in
Texas were working to strengthen
their anti-cruelty law again. When
news broke that a man used his
lawnmower to run over his puppy,
and that he could not be prosecut-
ed because the current law only
applies to harming another per-
son’s animal, the urgency to cor-
rect this loophole heightened. Not
only would the introduced bill
amend the current law to apply to
those who abuse their own animal
in a cruel manner, but it expands
the definition of “animal” to
include harming another person’s
livestock and the cruel killing of
stray and wild animals (Fikac
2005). 
This anecdotal analysis of anti-
cruelty statutes and their enforce-
ment indicates how idiosyncratic
anti-cruelty legislation across the
country is, how little logic is
applied to developing language
that clearly discriminates between
types of animal abuse, and how dif-
ficult it is to follow up on how
effective enforcement of both the
misdemeanor and the felony provi-
sions can be. Thus, one must con-
clude that the animal protection
movement has made significant
progress in upgrading anti-cruelty
legislation, but the underlying
logic of many of the changes is
confusing, and how the laws are
enforced (the most important
measure of a successful outcome)
is very difficult to measure.         
Animal Protection
Initiatives4
The animal protection movement
has used state initiative petitions
at various stages in the twentieth
century but with limited success
until fairly recently. Between 1940
and 1988, animal advocates quali-
fied just a handful of animal pro-
tection initiatives, and only one of
them passed—a 1972 measure in
South Dakota to ban dove hunting,
which was reversed eight years
later. Voters in other states reject-
ed a series of initiatives restricting
the killing of wildlife. For instance,
in 1983 Maine voters rejected a
ban on moose hunting; Ohio and
Oregon voters rejected anti-trap-
ping initiatives in 1978 and 1980,
respectively.
Since 1990, however, there has
been a proliferation of animal pro-
tection initiatives (Tables 7a,b).
Voters have approved seventeen of
twenty-five animal protection bal-
lot initiatives on subjects ranging
from cockfighting to bear baiting,
from horse slaughter to canned
hunts and the factory farming of
pigs. During this period, more than
four million signatures of regis-
tered voters have been gathered,
largely by animal advocates, to
qualify the twenty-five initiatives.
Most of the initiatives have been
spearheaded by the organizing
efforts of The HSUS and The Fund
for Animals. They carefully identi-
fied winnable issues in demograph-
ically favorable states, and they
organized volunteer petitioners,
conducted public attitude surveys
to guide the wording of the peti-
tions, raised money, and persuaded
voters to support the initiatives,
primarily by airing emotionally
compelling advertising showing
direct harm to animals.
Since 1991 the animal move-
ment’s victories in the initiative
process have been plentiful and
diverse. For example, animal advo-
cates have worked to place anti-
trapping initiatives on seven bal-
lots since 1995, prevailing in five
instances. Six other initiatives
dealt with hound hunting and bait-
ing of predators, and animal advo-
cates prevailed in four of them.
One measure related to the shoot-
ing of captive animals, in so-called
canned hunts, and two measures
related to the airborne hunting of
wolves in Alaska. Voters approved
all three of these measures. 
These victories have been built
on a proven formula for predicting
the success of an initiative. The ani-
mal issue must be selected careful-
ly and must be “right” for that par-
ticular state. State residents must
be polled to determine if there is
enough support for an issue. The
state must have people who can
donate money for the initiative,
newspapers and other media out-
lets must support the issue, and the
initiative must address a long over-
due reform. (For an example of the
last of these, before the 2002 initia-
tive that banned cockfighting,
Oklahoma was one of only three
states where cockfighting was still
legal, and a ban of the blood sport
was long overdue.) 
The success of animal protection
initiatives is even more impressive
when considering that humane
advocates have not been able to
leverage huge financial advantages
to secure victories. On the contrary,
in some cases, including the 1994
measure in Oregon to ban bear bait-
ing and hound hunting, animal pro-
tection groups have overcome the
lopsided financial advantages
enjoyed by their opponents. At the
same time, hunting groups have
been successful only in those cases
where they amassed huge war chests
that allowed them to blitz voters
with their message and erode public
support for animal protection initia-
tives. For example, hunting groups
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Table 7a




1990 Calif. Proposition 117: prohibits sport hunting of mountain lions 52 48
1992 Colo. Amendment 10: prohibits spring, bait, and hound hunting of black bears 70 30
1994 Ariz. Proposition 201: prohibits steel-jawed traps and other body-gripping traps 58 42
Ore. Measure 18: bans bear baiting and hound hunting of mountain lions 52 48
1996 Alaska Measure 3: bans same-day airborne hunting of wolves and foxes 58 42
Calif. Proposition 197*: allows trophy hunting of mountain lions 42 58
Colo. Amendment 14: bans leghold traps and other body-gripping traps 52 48
Mass. Question 1: restricts steel-jawed traps and other body-gripping traps, 
bans hound hunting of bears and bobcats, and eliminates quota for 
hunters on Fisheries and Wildlife Board 64 36
Ore. Measure 34*: repeals ban on bear baiting and hound hunting of bears 
and cougars 42 58
Wash. Initiative 655: bans bear baiting and hound hunting of bears, cougars, 
bobcats, and lynx 63 37
1998 Ariz. Proposition 201: prohibits cockfighting 68 32
Calif. Proposition 4: bans the use of cruel and indiscriminate traps and poisons 57 43
Calif. Proposition 6: prohibits slaughter of horses and sale of horse meat for 
human consumption 59 41
Colo. Amendment 13: provides uniform regulations of livestock 39 61
Colo. Amendment 14: regulates commercial hog factories 62 38
Mo. Proposition A: prohibits cockfighting 63 37
2000 Alaska Measure 1*: bans wildlife issues from ballot 36 64
Alaska Measure 6: bans land-and-shoot wolf hunting 53 47
Ariz. Proposition 102*: require two-thirds majority for wildlife issues 38 62
Mont. Initiative 143: prohibits new game farm licenses 52 48
Wash. Initiative 713: restricts steel-jawed traps and certain poisons 55 45
2002 Ariz. Proposition 201: expands gambling at greyhound tracks 20 80
Fla. Amendment 10: bans gestation crates for pigs 55 45
Ga. Measure 6*: specialty license plate for spay/neuter 71 29
Okla. State Question 687: bans cockfighting 56 44
Okla. State Question 698*: increases signature requirement for animal issues 46 54
Note: Italics indicate bad measures that were defeated. * Referendum (referred to ballot by state legislature).
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spent $1.8 million against an anti-
trapping initiative in Arizona in
1992. They spent $2.5 million in
Michigan and $750,000 in Idaho
against initiatives to ban bear hunt-
ing, and $2.5 million against the
dove hunting ban in Ohio.  Hunting
groups outspent animal advocates
by margins of from four to one to
ten to one in these campaigns. 
Animal advocates have not used
large amounts of cash to qualify
measures for the ballots, either.
Generally, they have deployed vol-
unteer petitioners to collect signa-
tures for ballot measures. Conven-
tional wisdom is that initiative
qualification in California requires
a minimum of $1 million for signa-
ture collection, but in 1990, Propo-
sition 117, the mountain lion initia-
tive, relied exclusively on volunteer
petitioners, and less than $500,000
was required to collect the neces-
sary signatures. In 1998 the Califor-
nia group Protect Pets and Wildlife,
a coalition of humane organizations
dedicated to banning the use of
steel-jawed leghold traps, spent
about $350,000 to amass more
than 700,000 signatures, relying
largely on seven thousand volunteer
petitioners. In Massachusetts in
1995–96, animal advocates spent
only $25,000 to gather nearly
200,000 signatures to add a meas-
ure to restrict trapping to the
November ballot. 
Not only have opponents tried to
thwart efforts by animal advocates
by outspending them, but they
have also organized measures to
make it more difficult to pass ani-
mal protection initiatives. They
have tried to raise the standard for
both qualification and voter
approval of measures. In 1996 Idaho
hunting groups soundly defeated
Proposition 2 to ban spring bear
hunting and the use of dogs or bait
to hunt bears. Their formula for suc-
cess was a campaign targeting “out-
of-state animal rights extremists”
who, they charged, wanted to do
away with “Idaho freedoms.” They
spent nearly $800,000 to defeat the
measure, while proponents spent
just a fraction of that amount in
support of the measure. Hunting
groups then succeeded in passing
sweeping changes to the initiative
process, drastically reducing the
time allowed for petitioning and
requiring that petitioners collect
signatures dispersed throughout the
state. For example, petitioners had
to amass at least 6 percent of regis-
tered voters in twenty-two of the
state’s forty-four counties. Before
that stipulation, there were no geo-
graphic distribution requirements. 
Since many of the initiative victo-
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Table 7b




1992 Ariz. Proposition 200: bans steel-jawed traps and other body-gripping traps 38 62
1996 Idaho Proposition 2: bans spring bait, and hound hunting of black bears 40 60
Mich. Proposal D: bans baiting and hounding of black bears 38 62
Mich. Proposal G*: exclusive authority over wildlife to National Resources 
Committee in Mich. 64 36
1998 Alaska Proposition 9: bans wolf snare trapping 36 64
Minn. Amendment 2: constitutional recognition of hunting 77 23
Ohio Issue 1: restores ban on mourning dove hunting 40 60
Utah Proposition 5*: requires two-thirds majority for wildlife ballot issues 56 44
Mass. Question 3: bans greyhound racing 49 51
2000 N.D. Question 1: constitutional recognition of hunting 77 23
Ore. Measure 97: restricts steel-jawed traps and certain poisons 59 41
Va. Question 2*: constitutional recognition of hunting 60 40
2002 Ark. Initiated Act 1: increases penalties for animal cruelty 38 62
* Referendum (referred to ballot by state legislature).
Source: Internal HSUS document on ballot measures.
ries affect hunting of wildlife,
hunters have used either the initia-
tive process or the state legislature
to pass resolutions that recognize
hunting as a constitutional right.
Initiatives preserving the constitu-
tional right to hunt have been
passed in Alaska, North Dakota, and
Virginia. Animal advocates, while
not supporting such measures, have
not been interested in pouring time
and money into defeating them. 
Overall, animal advocates have
been victorious 67 percent of the
time since 1991. While this may be
a significant number in itself, it is
crucial to weigh the significance of
each ballot initiative in its own
right. For example, one of the most
important initiative wins for the
animal protection movement was
passage of the 1992 Colorado
Amendment 10, which prohibited
sport hunting of bears in the spring
and the use of baits and/or hound-
ing. The first of its kind to succeed
in the initiative process, this meas-
ure set a precedent; Oregon, Mass-
achusetts, and Washington later
passed similar measures. The 2002
Florida initiative banning the use of
gestation crates for pregnant sows
was the first measure to be passed
regarding animals involved in
agribusiness. The success of this
initiative has opened the door for
animal advocates to consider using
the initiative process in other
states to effect further reforms on
behalf of farm animals. 
While animal advocates sustained
occasional setbacks—each one pro-
duced by the substantial investment
of dollars by opposition groups—
the movement has used the initia-
tive process carefully to obtain
some basic protections for animals.
The animal movement’s victories
have demonstrated that its values
strike a chord with the public.
These victories have also signaled to
policy makers that animal protec-
tion demands cannot be summarily
dismissed. The initiatives have pro-
vided another measure of confi-
dence to animal advocates in the
political sphere, prompting addi-
tional investment not only in initia-
tive campaigns, but also in tradi-
tional legislative campaigns. 
Conclusion
From 1900 to 1950, the animal pro-
tection movement had relatively lit-
tle political clout. In Moyer’s model,
the movement was in stage one and
two. In the 1950s the movement
began to have success passing new
legislation, and it began to grow as
new animal protection organiza-
tions were established. It steadily
moved into Moyer’s stage three. In
the late ’70s and early ’80s, it
moved into stage four as the media
discovered “animal rights” and gave
the movement significant exposure.
In the 1990s media attention
changed (Herzog 1995). While ref-
erence to animal issues and the
movement itself became much
more common in the media mar-
ketplace (e.g., several Seinfeld
episodes involved animal rights
issues), the cover stories that
focused on the movement became
much less common. Some in the
movement saw this decline as a fail-
ure and resorted to more aggressive
tactics, while others recognized
that animal protection could now
command a place in public policy
discussions and took advantage of
the openings presented.  
Although the animal protection
movement has been able to gain
significant protection for animals
in the past twenty years, much
remains to be done. Moyer’s move-
ment model predicts that, as suc-
cesses are gained and animal pro-
tection reforms are incorporated
into the public agenda, the move-
ment itself will wane. Such weaken-
ing is not inevitable. The move-
ment’s influence can continue to
grow and expand; while protecting
animals should always be the focus,
this focus must be viewed in con-
junction with appropriate goals to
gain more measurable outcomes
and thus more social acceptance
and political clout. The movement
must continue working to correct
earlier shortcomings and to push
the envelope on behalf of animals
to be resourceful and effective.
Notes
1California (lesser felony with identical lan-
guage. No language of intent); Colorado (sec-
ond or subsequent offense; knowingly); Con-
necticut (no language of intent); Iowa (second
or subsequent offense; intentionally); Illinois
(for cruel treatment; no language of intent);
Indiana (second or subsequent offense, know-
ingly, intentionally); Minnesota: (second con-
viction w/in five years); North Carolina: (same
language, intentionally); Nebraska (subse-
quent offenses); New Hampshire (second or
subsequent offense); New Mexico (fourth or
subsequent offense); Nevada (guilty after third
offense); Ohio (for second offense only); Penn-
sylvania (subsequent offenses; willfully, mali-
ciously); Tennessee (second or subsequent
offense; intentionally, knowingly); Texas (third
conviction; intentionally, knowingly); and Ver-
mont (second offense).
2California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and New Mexico.   
3Alaska; Arkansas; Hawaii; Idaho; Kansas;
Mississippi (language of intent only when per-
taining to dogs); North Dakota; South Caroli-
na; and Utah. 
4A significant portion of the data has been
taken from Pacelle 2001 and 2003 with the
permission of the author. 
Literature Cited
Animal Welfare Institute. 1990.
Animals and their legal rights: A
survey of American laws from
1641 to 1990. 4h ed. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Animal Welfare Insti-
tute.
Ascione, F.R., and P. Arkow. 1999.
Child abuse, domestic violence,
and animal abuse: Linking the
circles of compassion for preven-
tion and intervention. West
Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University
Press.
Black, H.C., J.R. Nolan, J.M.
Nolan-Haley, M.J. Connolly, S.C.
Hicks, and M.N. Alibrandi. 1990.
Black’s law dictionary. 6h ed. St.
Paul: West Publishing Company. 
Bollinger, V. 1998. One deadly
night at Noah’s Ark. HSUS
News, 43(2): 36–40.
Favre, D.S., and M. Loring. 1983.
Animal law. Westport, Conn.:
Quorum Books. 
93Progress in Animal Legislation: Measurement and Assessment
Fikac P. 2004. Law rarely bites ani-
mal abusers: In its first three
years, statute has put just 21 peo-
ple in prison. San Antonio
Express-News, June 1. 
————. 2005. Animal cruelty
crackdown touted. San Antonio
Express-News, March 20. 
Herzog, H.A. 1995. Has public
interest in animal rights peaked?
American Psychologist 50:
945–947.
The Humane Society of the United
States (HSUS). 1956. Senate
committee schedules April
slaughter bill hearing. HSUS
News, April, 1.
————. 2004. Internal docu-
ment on federal legislative
accomplishments. Washington,
D.C.: HSUS.




Lockwood, R., and F.R.
Ascione. 1997. Cruelty to ani-
mals and interpersonal violence:
Readings in research and appli-
cation. West Lafayette, Ind.: Pur-
due University Press.
Moyer, B. 1987. The movement
action plan: A strategic frame-
work describing the eight stages
of successful social movements.





Pacelle, W. 2001. The animal pro-
tection movement: A modern-
day model use of the initiative
process. In The battle over citizen
lawmaking: The growing regula-
tion of initiative and referendum:
2001, ed. M.D. Waters, 109–119.
Durham: Carolina Academic
Press.    
————. 2003. The animal pro-
tection movement and I and R.
In Initiative and referendum
almanac: 2003, ed. M.D. Waters,
482–484. Durham, N.C.: Caroli-
na Academic Press.  
Unti, B. 2004. Protecting all ani-
mals: A fifty-year history of The
Humane Society of the United
States . Washington,  D.C. :
Humane Society Press. 
Unti, B., and A.N. Rowan. 2001. A
social history of postwar animal
protection. In The State of the
Animals: 2001, ed. D.J. Salem
and A.N. Rowan, 21–37. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Humane Society
Press. 
Warrick, J. 2001. They die piece by
piece:  In overtaxed plants,
humane treatment of cattle is
often a battle lost. The Washing-
ton Post, April 10.  
Wiebers, M.S.W., A. Gillan, and
D.W. Wiebers. 2000. Souls like
ourselves: Inspired thoughts for
personal and planetary advance-
ment. Rochester, Minn.: Sojourn
Press. 
94 The State of the Animals III: 2005
